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Abstract
This study proposes a model that describes banks’ decisions about how much liquidity they
hold and analyzes how liquidity regulations affect the amount of their lending. In literature, it
is pointed out that banks are likely to hold ex-post excess liquidity under a liquidity regulation
when some depositors make decisions based on the banks’ soundness. This result implies that
the regulation forces banks to suffer an unnecessary decrease of their lending, and thus, they
would try to mitigate the loss by adjusting their portfolio. The aim of this study is to investigate
whether banks’ lending decreases or not when there exist multiple sets of assets that satisfy a
liquidity regulation. In addition, we analyze two types of liquidity regulation; one focuses on
banks’ survivability, and the other focuses on continuity of their liquidity holding. The model
shows that, even when there exist other ways to satisfy the regulations besides holding only
reserves, banks still hold an ex-post excess amount of liquidity under either type of liquidity
regulation. However, the model also shows that the amount of banks’ lending varies according
to how they satisfy the liquidity regulation and the probability that a severe reduction of lending
happens depends partly on the regulation’s type. These results implies that banks’ decisions
for mitigating losses caused by liquidity regulations lead to an undesired outcome, and thus, we
consider more carefully banks’ decisions under liquidity regulations.
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1 Introduction
After the financial crisis of 2007–2008, the danger of negative externalities that highly indebted
financial institutions face gained attention and the Basel Committee developed a new regulatory
framework on banks, Basel III , to make the financial system stable. This framework introduces
new rules governing banks’ debt structures and requirements for holding certain types of liquid
asset. There is, however, a remarkable asymmetry between the economic analysis of the capital and
liquidity regulations.
As to analyses of capital regulations, the pioneering work of Modigliani and Miller (1958) provides
a theoretical framework. After the introduction of the international regulations on banks’ capital
in 1988, there are some models that analyze banks’ capital such as Keeley (1990). Then, in 2000s,
especially after the financial crisis, there are a large number of studies on the banks’ capital and
capital regulations. Although there is little agreement on the optimal level of requirements and the
regulations’ costs, there exist some common settings for analyzing capital regulations.
However, the amount of discussion about regulating liquidity is much less than that on capital
regulations, and moreover, there is no benchmark theory regarding regulating liquidity provision
by intermediaries. Before the financial crisis, there were studies of liquidity provision by financial
intermediaries, but liquidity regulations got not so much attentions.
Nevertheless, Basel III introduces two new concepts, the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net
stable funding ratio (NSFR), and the deadline by which banks will be compelled to meet requirements
for these ratios is 2019. Thus, we need to consider what the optimal way to regulate bank’s liquidity
is. To investigate this issue, Diamond and Kashyap (2016) provide a baseline model.
Diamond and Kashyap (2016) analyze two types of liquidity regulation that represent NSFR and
LCR, and show that two important results are obtained. First, banks must hold an excess amount
of safe assets and reduce their lending regardless of the regulation’s type when some depositors
determine whether or not they should withdraw their deposits early based on the banks’ soundness
and when the regulation restricts the banks’ decisions. Second, which type of regulation is optimal
depends on the banks’ heterogeneity. If the bank’s heterogeneity is sufficiently large, LCR-type
regulation can lead to a smaller reduction of lending than NSFR-type one does, otherwise NSFR-
type one leads to a smaller reduction of the banks’ lending.
The result that banks suffer an unnecessary reduction of lending under liquidity regulations
implies that the banks can suffer losses, and thus, they would try to mitigate the losses in some way.
Considering that some of their safe assets are needed just to satisfy the regulation’s requirement,
they would be able to replace the assets with some other assets that can work as sources of both
liquidity and profits. In the situation where banks are reluctant to hold excess safe assets under a
liquidity regulation, introducing such assets raises a new question of how banks satisfy the liquidity
regulation. When there exists another asset that can be held as less effective liquidity but yield
larger return than the safe asset, there is a probability that the banks can substitute these assets for
some of the unnecessary safe assets and reduce losses by the regulation. Thus, we need to analyze
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how the regulation affects banks’ decisions and the reduction of their lending taking their choices of
assets into account.
To address these issues in more depth, we suppose that there are “liquid assets” in addition to
safe assets and lending (long-term assets). Then, we investigate how a bank satisfies a requirement
of a liquidity regulation and how its decision and the amount of its lending vary according to the
regulation’s type.
In the model presented in this study, there exist one bank and its depositors. The bank raises
funds by offering demand deposits to the depositors and by issuing shares, and then, it uses some of
the funds to invest in assets and lends the remainder. Because the deposits are demand deposits, the
depositors can withdraw their deposits as they want, and thus, some of withdrawals happen before
the bank receives the return of tits lending. Then, in order to repay to these depositors, it needs to
hold some liquidity and/or liquidate its assets and/or loans. When there exists a liquidity regulation,
the bank need to satisfy its requirement.
In this study, we analyze two types of liquidity regulation, one focuses on banks’ survivability,
and the other requires them holding liquidity at any time. The model shows that, under either type
of regulation, the bank still holds an ex-post excess amount of liquidity as Diamond and Kashyap
(2016) show, even when it can use the liquid assets as sources of liquidity. This result derives as
follows. A requirement of a liquidity regulation must be determined based on the most dangerous
case, that is, the largest amount of early repayment. Then, when some depositors determine whether
or not to withdraw their deposits early based on the bank’s soundness, a regulator requires that it
holds enough liquidity to repay to these depositors. However, when it holds enough liquidity under
the regulation and satisfies the requirement, the depositors choose not to withdraw their deposits
early because they think the bank is sound enough. Thus, it holds an ex-post excess amount of
liquidity under the liquidity regulation, and this result does not depend on what assets it holds as
liquidity.
Although introducing the liquid assets cannot solve the problem of excess liquidity, the existence
of the liquid assets yields two new results. First, under a liquidity regulation, the model shows that
the bank can choose to hold both the safe assets and the liquid assets as well as to rely only on
the safe assets and that the former is chosen when the discount rate for the liquidated liquid asset
is sufficiently large. In other words, when the liquid assets work efficiently as liquidity, the bank
substitutes them for the safe assets. Second, the model shows that, although holding only the safe
assets and holding both the safe assets and the liquid assets are indifferent regarding a liquidity
regulation, the latter causes a larger reduction of the bank’s lending than the former does, and, at
the same time, the bank obtains larger profits from the former portfolio. In other words, the bank
chooses to decrease its lending as the privately optimal response to the regulation. Moreover, the
probability that it chooses to hold both the safe assets and the liquid assets depends partly on the
regulation’s type. These results imply that banks’ decisions for mitigating losses caused by a liquidity
regulation lead to an undesired outcome with respect to the amount of their lending, and thus, we
consider more carefully banks’ decisions under liquidity regulations.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews literature. Section 3
presents the model and explains its settings, and Section 4 examines the bank’s decision. Section 5
presents the comparison of two types of liquidity regulation, and Section 6 presents our conclusion.
2 Review of literature
As it is mentioned above, there has been little literature on liquidity regulations, particularly before
the crisis. The early contributes are Rochet (2004, 2008) and Allen and Gale (2004). These papers
focus on some market failures and consider which problems we need liquidity regulations to solve.
Rochet argues that simple liquidity ratios can potentially deal with problems in payment systems
and moral hazard problems at the individual bank level due to opaqueness of assets. Allen and Gale
(2004) study regulations of the financial system using a welfare analysis, and argue that there may
be a role for liquidity regulations when markets for aggregate risks are incomplete.
After the crisis and implementation of new liquidity requirements for banks such as the Liquidity
Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stability Funding Ratio (NSFR) 1, some researchers investigate
the effectiveness of liquidity regulations by comparing them with other regulations, such as capital
regulations.
Vives (2014) supposes that banks can become either insolvent or illiquid and analyzes efficient
combinations of capital and liquidity regulations by using a global game analysis. He finds that
the two regulations are not simple substitutes, and their effectiveness vary according to whether
banks’ problems are insolvency or illiquidity. In particular, if depositors are more likely to run,
the liquidity regulation can enhance the banks’ stability. Calomiris et al. (2018) point out that a
liquidity regulation improves banks’ incentives to manage risk more easily than a capital regulation
because banks’ liquidity is more observable and verifiable for outsiders than their capital. Perotti
and Suarez (2011) develop a model in which banks use too much amount of short term funding and
compare a liquidity regulation with Pigovian taxes. They point out that whether or not the liquidity
regulation solves the problem depends on what heterogeneity dominates. When the banks differ in
credit opportunities, Pigovian taxes are best, whereas the liquidity regulation is best when they differ
in their risk taking incentives. Walther (2016) also compares a liquidity regulation with Pigovian
taxes and argues that a constraint-based liquidity regulation works efficiently and it does not require
knowledge of banks’ private information such as funding costs and average returns to investment,
whereas efficient Pigovian taxes need these information.
Some studies show that a liquidity regulation does not only improve banks’ stability with respect
to illiquidity but also it changes status of aggregate economy, and in turn, affects banks’ decisions.
Farhi et al. (2009) investigate how a liquidity regulation affects banks’ risk taking and point out that,
in the financial system under the liquidity regulation, there exists a sufficient amount of aggregate
1Cecchetti and Kashyap (2018) explain the objects of the two tools. LCR urges banks to hold enough amounts of
liquidity, whereas NSFR guarantees their stable maturity transformations.
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investment in short-term assets to achieve the efficient risk sharing amount the banks.
However, some negative effects of liquidity regulations are also pointed out. One of them is
that a liquidity regulation can reduce banks’ lending and liquidity creation. Roberts et al. (2018)
empirically investigate the effects of liquidity regulation and find that banks subject to LCR create
less liquidity per dollar of assets. Thus, they argue that LCR has a negative effect on banks’ lending
and at least some of this effect is unlikely to be due to capital regulations. Carletti et al. (2018)
theoretically analyze how banks choose their portfolio under liquidity and/or capital regulations and
point that, because holding so much liquidity reduces their profits and increases probability of their
insolvency, the liquidity regulation does not always improve their stability.
One of the other negative externality of liquidity regulations is that it can deteriorate adverse
selection in interbank markets and lead to collapse of them because fewer sales of banks’ assets
reflect cash needs under a liquidity regulation. Malherbe (2014) considers interbank markets with
elastic demands for banks’ assets and points out that the adverse selection impairs liquidity provision
between banks and then leads them to hold more liquidity. He concludes that this negative feedback
effect may result in hoarding behavior and a market breakdown. Heider et al. (2015) investigate a
similar problem at interbank markets with inelastic demands and argue that the market breakdown
can be prevented when the liquidity regulation is implemented at the appropriate level.
Diamond and Kashyap (2016) consider banks’ excess liquidity as a negative externality of a
liquidity regulation. The first study of banks’ excess liquidity is Cooper and Ross (1998). Based on
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), they investigate banks’ portfolio choices and point out that they hold
excess liquidity when liquidation cost of an insolvent bank is sufficiently high. Although Cooper and
Ross (1998) argue that there exists a probability that banks hold excess liquidity when they become
insolvent, Ennis and Keister (2006) extend the results of Cooper and Ross (1998) and point out that
the reason why banks hold excess liquidity is only to prevent their depositors’ massive withdraw.
Then, based on these results, Diamond and Kashyap (2016) find that banks hold an ex-post excess
amount of liquidity when some of depositors’ withdrawals depend on the banks’ soundness under
a liquidity regulation. In addition, they argue that the amount of excess liquidity varies according
to the type of liquidity regulation and that which type of regulation is effective depends on the
heterogeneity of the banks.
As mentioned above, however, these researches does not consider banks’ portfolio choices with
respect to their assets that work as liquidity. Thus, banks’ response to a liquidity regulation is
not investigated fully. Recently, some researchers analyze the effects of a liquidity regulation with
respect to banks’ choices of liabilities such as insecure debt and secured debt (Matta and Perotti,
2015; Ko¨rding and Scheubel, 2018). However, researches of changes of banks’ safe assets under
a liquidity regulation are still scarce, and thus, this study provides some insights regarding this
question.
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3 Model
In this section, based on Diamond and Kashyap (2016), we develop a model in which a bank makes
decision about its liquidity holding.
3.1 Baseline settings
There are two types of actor in the economy: a bank (banker), its depositors, and there are three
dates: t = 0, 1, 2. In addition, there exists a liquidity regulation. In this study, we consider two
types of regulation, and both require that the bank does not go bankrupt at t = 1. We assume that
there is no uncertainty in the economy, and thus, both the banks and its depositors can estimate the
other’s decisions precisely.
At t = 0, the bank raises funds, invests some of the funds in some assets and lends the remainder.
On the other hand, the bank’s depositors obtain demand deposits. At t = 1, some of the depositors
decide to withdraw their deposit, and the bank repays to them by using its asset returns and/or
liquidating its assets and/or its claim of the lending. And then, at t = 2, it receives the returns
of its assets and lending if it still holds them. Then, it repays to the remaining depositors and the
banker obtains the residual profit if it exists. Therefore, in the model, the bank tries to maximize
its remaining profit by choosing the optimal portfolio at t = 0 under a constraint of the liquidity
regulation.
3.2 Settings: depositors
Suppose that there exist many depositors and their total size is normalized as 1. At t = 0, each of
them obtains D units of demand deposits. The gross rate of return of one-period deposit is assumed
rd, and thus, the gross rate of return is r
2
d when a deposit is withdrawn at t = 2.
The depositors can withdraw their deposits either t = 1 or t = 2. We assume their decisions as
follows.
Assumption 1. There exist three types of depositor: impatient, nervous, and patient, and the ratios
of each type to total depositors are η, δ, 1 − η − δ, respectively. The impatient depositors always
withdraw their deposits at t = 1, and the patient depositors always withdraw their deposits at t = 2.
The nervous depositors withdraw their deposits at t = 1 unless the bank satisfies a constraint by the
liquidity regulation.
Then, the bank’s repayment at t = 1 is ηDrd or (η +∆)Drd based on its decision (soundness).
3.3 Settings: bank
Suppose that the bank raises funds B by offering demand deposits to the depositors and by issuing
shares to itself. Because it raises funds D by receiving deposit, B −D is raised by issuing shares.
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At t = 0, it decides how to use B so that its residual profit at t = 2 is maximized. With respect
to assets that it can invest at t = 0 and lending, we have the following assumption.
Assumption 2. There exist two types of asset that the bank can invest at t = 0: safe assets and
liquid assets. For simplification, we assume that there exists no asset to invest at t = 1. One unit of
invest at t = 0 in the safe asset returns rs at t = 1 On the other hand, one unit of invest at t = 0 in
the liquid asset returns R1 at t = 2.
Moreover, the bank can lend its funds at t = 0. One unit of lending returns R2 at t = 2.
In addition, we assume about the liquidation of the bank’s assets and loans as follows.
Assumption 3. At t = 1, the bank can liquidate its liquid assets and lending (loans) to raise funds.
Liquidating one unit of liquid asset returns βR1, and liquidating one unit of loan returns αR2, where
0 ≤ α < β < 1 is satisfied.
Then, we have the following assumption about the returns of the assets.
Assumption 4. The returns of the safe asset, the liquid asset and the lending satisfy
αR2 < βR1 < rs < R1 < R2.
Therefore, in order to obtain some amount of funds at t = 1, investing in the safe asset is the
most efficient way. On the other hand, in order to obtain some amount of funds at t = 2, lending is
the most efficient way.
Denote the ratios of the bank’s investment in the liquid assets and the safe assets as s1, s2,
respectively, and s1, s2 are nonnegative and satisfy and s1 + s2 ≤ 1. Then, the maximum amount of
funds that the bank can raise at t = 1 without liquidating its loan is s2Brs + βs1BR1. We denote
this amount as the bank’s liquidity and the pair (s1, s2) as the bank’s liquidity decision.
4 Analysis
4.1 No liquidity regulation
As a first benchmark, we consider the bank’s liquidity decision when there exists no liquidity reg-
ulation. Because there are no uncertainty and no constraint on the bank’s decision by liquidity
regulation, the nervous depositors does not withdraw their deposits at t = 1, and thus, the amount
that the bank needs to repay is ηrdD.
Define the efficient ratio of safe assets as follows.
Definition 1. Define the efficient ratio of safe asset as s¨2, that is, the ratio with that the
bank can obtain funds just equal to the repayment to the impatient depositors at t = 1. This ratio is
expressed as
s¨2 ≡
ηDrd
Brs
.
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Then, because the bank knows that it needs funds to repay ηDrD and that investing in safe assets
is the most efficient way to obtain funds at t = 1, its liquidity decision (s1, s2) satisfies s2 ≤ s¨2. In
addition, because holding excess liquidity between t = 1 and t = 2 is less efficient than holding loans,
the optimal liquidity decision is (0, s¨2). The following proposition summarizes the bank’s optimal
liquidity decision.
Proposition 1. When the nervous depositors does not withdraw their deposits at t = 1, that is,
∆ = 0, the bank’s optimal liquidity decision satisfies (s1, s2) = (0, s¨2).
In other words, when only the impatient deposits withdraw at t = 1, the bank’s optimal liquidity
decision is investing in only the safe assets and the ratio is the efficient ratio of safe assets.
4.2 Analysis 2: with liquidity regulation
4.2.1 Liquidity under a liquidity regulation
In this subsection, we consider the bank’s liquidity decision when there exists a liquidity regulation.
Denote the bank’s residual profit at t = 2 when its liquidity decision is (s1, s2) as R(s1, s2). Suppose
that only the impatient depositors withdraw their deposits at t = 1, that is, ∆ = 0 is satisfied. Then,
the outcome of the bank’s liquidity decision can be classified into four cases based on its behavior
at t = 1. In the first case, it has enough return of the safe assets to repay ηDrd to the impatient
depositors at t = 1. In the second case, return of its safe assets is not enough to repay ηDrd but it
hold a sufficient amount of the liquid assets, and thus, it liquidates (some part of) its liquid assets.
In the third case, both of its assets are not enough to repay ηDrd, and thus, it liquidate (some part
of) its lending. In the fourth case, its assets and lending are not enough to raise funds to repay ηDrd,
and thus, it goes bankrupt. Based on our assumption, however, it must not go bankrupt at t = 1
under liquidity regulations, and thus, we do not consider the fourth case.
Denote the ratio of the liquidated liquid assets in the second case as µ, and the ratio of the
liquidated lending in the third case as ν. In addition, denote the bank’s residual profits in the former
three cases as RA(s1, s2),R
B(s1, s2) and R
C(s1, s2), respectively. Then, they are expressed as
RA(s1, s2) ≡ (1− s1 − s2)BR2 + s1BR1 + s2Brs − ηDrd − (1− η)Dr
2
d,
= BR2 − B(R2 −R1)s1 − B(R2 − rs)s2 − ηDrd − (1− η)Dr
2
d,
RB(s1, s2) ≡ (1− s1 − s2)BR2 + (s1 − µ)BR1 +
[
µβBR1 + s2Brs − ηDrd
]
− (1− η)Dr2d,
= BR2 − B(R2 −R1)s1 − B
(
R2 −
rs
β
)
s2 −
ηDrd
β
− (1− η)Dr2d,
RC(s1, s2) ≡ (1− s1 − s2 − ν)BR2 +
[
ναBR2 + βs1BR1 + s2Brs − ηDrd
]
− (1− η)Dr2d,
= BR2 +B
(
βR1
α
−R2
)
s1 +B
(rs
α
−R2
)
s2 −
ηDrd
α
− (1− η)Dr2d,
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where µ ≡ (ηDrd − s2Brs)/βBR1 and ν ≡ (ηDrd − βs1BR1 − s2Brs)/αBR2.
Suppose that there exists a liquidity regulation that adds a constraint on the bank’s decision. We
consider two types of liquidity regulation: NSFR-type and LCR-type.
NSFR-type regulation requires that the bank’s residual profit at t = 2 is nonnegative even when
it liquidates (some part of) its loans. In other words, it must not go bankrupt under NSFR-type
regulation. On the other hands, LCR-type regulation requires that it holds liquidity more than some
fraction of remaining repayment between t = 1 and t = 2. In other words, it always hold some
liquidity under LCR-type regulation.
First, consider NSFR-type regulation. Although the requirement of the regulation seems to mean
that RC(s1, s2) ≥ 0 is satisfied, it is not correct. Because R
C(s1, s2) is defined based on ∆ = 0,
RC(s1, s2) ≥ 0 does not always guarantee that the bank’s residual profit is non-negative even when
∆ ̸= 0 is satisfied. In other words, satisfying RC(s1, s2) ≥ 0 is not enough to satisfy the requirement
of NSFR-type regulation and it is needed that the bank’s residual profit must be non-negative even
when the repayment at t = 1 is (η +∆)Drd. This residual profit is easily calculated by replacing η
in RC(s1, s2) with η +∆. Then, the constraint is expressed as
BR2 +B
(
βR1
α
−R2
)
s1 +B
(rs
α
−R2
)
s2 −
(η +∆)Drd
α
− (1− η −∆)Dr2d ≥ 0,
⇔ s1 ≥ −
rs − αR2
βR1 − αR2
s2 +
(η +∆)Drd + α(1− η −∆)Dr
2
d − αBR2
B(βR1 − αR2)
≡ sN
1
(s2).
Second, consider LCR-type regulation. As it is in the case of NSFR-type regulation, the constraint
must be defined based on the case where the repayment at t = 1 is (η+∆)Drd. LCR-type regulation
requires the bank holding liquidity more than some fraction of remaining repayment between t = 1
and t = 2 and we denote this fraction as ρ. Then, the constraint is expressed as
s2Brs + βs1BR1 ≥ (η +∆)rdD + ρ(1− η −∆)r
2
dD,
⇔ s1 ≥ −
rs
βR1
s2 +
(η +∆)rdD + ρ(1− η −∆)r
2
dD
βBR1
≡ sL
1
(s2).
When there exists i-type regulation, the bank’s liquidity decision (s¯2, s¯2) must satisfy at least
s¯1 ≥ s
i
1
(s¯2) where i = N under NSFR-type regulation and i = L under LCR-type one. Then,
consider whether or not (s1, s2) = (0, s¨2) satisfies the conditions. Because s2Brs + βs1BR1 with
(s1, s2) = (0, s¨2) is ηDrd, it is clear that (0, s¨2) does not satisfy the constraint of LCR-type regulation.
With regard to NSFR-type one, 0 ≥ sN
1
(s¨2) is not satisfied with some parameters. In addition,
when 0 ≥ sN
1
(s¨2), the bank’s optimal liquidity decision under no regulation is also optimal under the
regulation, and thus, there is no need to regulate the bank. In other words, when liquidity regulations
affect the bank’s decision, it cannot choose (0, s¨2) under the regulations.
However, when it changes its decision and satisfies the regulations, the nervous depositors regard
it as sound and does not withdraw their deposits at t = 1. Then, it implies that the actual repayment
at t = 1 is ηDrd and the ex-post optimal liquidity decision is (0, s¨2) that the bank cannot choose.
The result is summarized as follows.
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Proposition 2. Suppose that the bank can hold the safe assets and/or the liquid assets as liquidity.
In addition, suppose that there exists NSFR-type regulation or LCR-type one and that the bank cannot
choose (s1, s2) = (0, s¨2) under either of the regulations. Then, regardless of the type of regulation,
the bank holds an ex-post excess amount of liquidity, and thus, the bank’s lending decrease under the
liquidity regulations.
This result is also obtained in Diamond and Kashyap (2016) where the liquid assets do not exists.
Thus, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Introducing another assets that can be used to obtain liquidity in addition to the safe
assets does not prevent unnecessary decrease of banks’ lending happening.
4.2.2 Bank’s decision under a liquidity regulation
Suppose that there exists i-type regulation and 0 ≤ si
1
(s¨2)(i = NorL) is not satisfied, in other
words, the bank cannot chose (s1, s2) = (0, s¨2) under the regulations. In addition, assume that
sN
1
(s2) < s
L
1
(s2) is satisfied ∀s2 ∈ [0, 1]. This assumption is just to keep the figures simple and does
not affect the results described here. Because the actual repayment at t = 1 is ηDrd, the bank’s
residual profit is defined as RA(s1, s2),R
B(s1, s2) or R
C(s1, s2) in the previous subsection.
First, consider the bank’s liquidity decision when its residual profit is RC(s1, s2). In this case,
the bank’s liquidity is not enough to repay ηDrd at t = 1. This implies that s2Brs+βs1BR1 < ηDrd
is satisfied. Then, by rewriting the inequality, we have
s1 < −
rs
βR1
s2 +
ηDrd
βBR1
= −
rs
βR1
(s2 − s¨2) ≡ s
c
1
(s2).
The bank’s liquidity decision (s1, s2) that satisfies the above inequality exists the lower part of the
line s1 = s
c
1
(s2) in Figure 1.
Because at least s2Brs+ βs1BR1 ≥ (η+∆)Drd is satisfied under LCR-type regulation, this case
does not happen under LCR-type one. Then, suppose that there exists NSFR-type regulation. The
constraint of NSFR-type regulation is expressed as
s1 ≥ −
rs − αR2
βR1 − αR2
s2 +
(η +∆)Drd + α(1− η −∆)Dr
2
d − αBR2
B(βR1 − αR2)
.
As it is mentioned above, we suppose that (s1, s2) = (0, s¨2) does not satisfy the constraint of
NSFR-type regulation, and thus, the line s1 = s
N
1
(s2) intersects with x axis at the left part of the
point (0, s¨2). In addition, because rs > βR1 is satisfied from the assumption, we have
−
rs
βR1
> −
rs − αR2
βR1 − αR2
.
Then, as it is shown in Figure 1, there is no liquidity decision (s1, s2) that satisfies both s1 < s
c
1
(s2)
and s1 ≥ s
N
1
(s2) at the same time. It implies that the bank’s residual profit does not expressed as
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Figure 1: the constraints regarding RC(s1, s2) Figure 2: the regions separated by s2 = s¨2
RC(s1, s2) under either NSFR-type regulation or LCR-type one. In other words, the liquidation of
the bank’s loans does not happen under the regulations.
Second, consider the bank’s liquidity decision when its residual profit is RB(s1, s2). In this case,
its safe assets in not enough to repay ηDrd at t = 1 but it holds a sufficient amount of the liquid
assets. It implies that s < s¨2 and ηDrd ≤ s2Brs + βs1BR1 are satisfied. As it is shown in Figure 1,
ηDrd ≤ s2Brs + βs1BR1, that is, s
c
1
(s2) ≤ s1 is always satisfied when the bank’s liquidity decision
satisfies one of the constraints of the regulations. Then, when its residual profit is RB(s1, s2), the
bank’s liquidity decision (s1, s2) exists on the region B under LCR-type regulation and on the region
B +B′ under LCR-type one in Figure 2.
Suppose that there exists NSFR-type regulation. Then, the bank’s problem is expressed as
max
s1,s2
RB(s1, s2) ≡BR2 − B(R2 −R1)s1 − B
(
R2 −
rs
β
)
s2 −
ηDrd
β
− (1− η)Dr2d
s.t. 0 ≤ s1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ s2 < s¨2, 0 ≤ s1 + s2 ≤ 1,
sN
1
(s2) ≤ s1.
With fixed value s¯2, it is clear that R
B(s1, s¯2) is decreasing in s1, and thus, s
N
1
(s¯2) is the optimal
ratio of the liquid assets. Then, by substituting s1 = s
N
1
(s¯2) into −B(R2 − R1)s1 − B
(
R2 −
rs
β
)
s¯2,
we have
− B(R2 −R1)F¯ +B(R2 −R1)
rs − αR2
βR1 − αR2
s¯2 − B
(
R2 −
rs
β
)
s¯2,
= −B(R2 −R1)F¯ +
BR2
β(βR1 − αR2)
(β − α)(rs − βR1)s¯2,
where F¯ ≡
(η +∆)Drd + α(1− η −∆)Dr
2
d − αBR2
B(βR1 − αR2)
.
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Thus, RB
(
sN
1
(s2), s2
)
is increasing in s2. It implies that the optimal liquidity decision under NSFR-
type regulation (the region B + B′) is (sN
1
(sˇ2), sˇ2) where sˇ2 is sufficiently close to s¨2 but not equal
to s¨2.
Next, suppose that there exists LCR-type regulation. With fixed value s¯2, R
B(s1, s¯2) is decreasing
in s1. Thus, s
L
1
(s¯2) is the optimal ratio of the liquid assets. Then, by substituting s1 = s
L
1
(s¯2) into
−B(R2 −R1)s1 − B
(
R2 −
rs
β
)
s¯2, we have
− B(R2 −R1)L¯+B(R2 −R1)
rS
βR1
s¯2 − B
(
R2 −
rs
β
)
s¯2,
= −B(R2 −R1)L¯+
BR2
βR1
(rs − βR1)s¯2,
where L¯ ≡
(η +∆)Drd + ρ(1− η −∆)Dr
2
d
βR1
.
Thus, RB
(
sN
1
(s2), s2
)
is increasing in s2 under LCR-type regulation. Therefore, the optimal liquidity
decision under LCR-type regulation (the region B) is (sL
1
(sˇ2), sˇ2).
Finally, consider the bank’s liquidity decision when its residual profit is RA(s1, s2). In this
case, it holds a sufficient amount of assets to repay ηDrd at t = 1. It implies that s¨2 ≤ s2 and
ηDrd ≤ s2Brs + βs1BR1 are satisfied, and the latter is satisfied when the bank’s liquidity decision
satisfies either the constraint of NSFR-type regulation or LCR-type one. Then, when the bank’s
residual profit is RA(s1, s2), its liquidity decision (s1, s2) exists on the region A under LCR-type
regulation and on the region A+ A′ under LCR-type one in Figure 2.
Suppose that there exists NSFR-type regulation. Then, the bank’s problem is expressed as
max
s1,s2
RA(s1, s2) ≡BR2 − B(R2 −R1)s1 − B(R2 − rs)s2 − ηDrd − (1− η)Dr
2
d,
s.t. 0 ≤ s1 ≤ 1, s¨2 ≤ s2 ≤ 1, s1 + s2 ≤ 1,
sN
1
(s2) ≤ s1.
With fixed value s¯2, it is clear that R
A(s1, s¯2) is decreasing in s1. Thus, s
N
1
(s¯2) is the optimal ratio
of liquid assets. Then, by substituting s1 = s
N
1
(s¯2) into −B(R2 −R1)s1 − B(R2 − rs)s¯2, we have
− B(R2 −R1)F¯ +B(R2 −R1)
rsαR2
βR1 − αR2
s¯2 − B(R2 − rs)s¯2,
= −B(R2 −R1)F¯ +B
[
(R2 −R1)
rs − αR2
βR1 − αR2
− (R2 − rs)
]
s¯2,
where the sign of the coefficient of s¯2 depends on the parameters. Thus, we have
∂RA
(
sN
1
(s2), s2
)
∂s2
≥ 0 ⇔
(R2 −R1)rs + (R1 − rs)αR2
R1(R2 − rs)
≡ β˜N ≥ β.
Denote s2 that satisfied s
N
1
(s2) = 0 as sˆ
N
2
, that is, the point where the line s1 = s
N
1
(s2) intersects with
s2 axis. Then, when β˜
N ≥ β, RA
(
sN
1
(s2), s2
)
is increasing in s2 and the optimal liquidity decision
12
is (s1, s2) = (0, sˆ
N
2
). On the other hand, when β˜N < β, RA
(
sN
1
(s2), s2
)
is decreasing in s2 and the
optimal liquidity decision is (s1, s2) =
(
sN
1
(s¨2), s¨2
)
.
Next, suppose that there exists LCR-type regulation.With fixed value s¯2, R
A(s1, s¯2) is decreasing
in s1. Thus, s
L
1
(s¯2) is the optimal ratio of the liquid assets. Then, by substituting s1 = s
L
1
(s¯2) into
−B(R2 −R1)s1 − B(R2 − rs)s¯2, we have
− B(R2 −R1)L¯+B(R2 −R1)
rs
βR1
s¯2 − B(R2 − rs)s¯2,
= −B(R2 −R1)L¯+B
[
(R2 −R1)
rs
βR1
− (R2 − rs)
]
s¯2,
where the sign of the coefficient of s¯2 depends on the parameters. Thus, we have
∂RA
(
sN
1
(s2), s2
)
∂s2
≥ 0 ⇔
rs(R2 −R1)
R1(R2 − rs)
≡ β˜L ≥ β.
Denote s2 that satisfied s
L
1
(s2) = 0 as sˆ
L
2
, that is, the point where the line s1 = s
L
1
(s2) intersects with
s2 axis. Then, when β˜
L ≥ β, the optimal liquidity decision is (s1, s2) = (0, sˆ
L
2
). On the other hand,
when β˜L < β, the optimal liquidity decision is (s1, s2) =
(
sL
1
(s¨2), s¨2
)
.
Then, compare RA(s1, s2) with R
B(s1, s2) with some liquidity decision (s¯1, s¯2). By calculating
RA(s¯1, s¯2)−R
B(s¯1, s¯2) , we have
RA(s¯1, s¯2)−R
B(s¯1, s¯2) =
1− β
β
(ηDrd − s2Brs).
Thus, RA
(
si
1
(s¨2), s¨2
)
= RB
(
si
1
(s¨2), s¨2) (i = N,L) is satisfied. However, s2 < s¨2 is satisfied when the
bank’s residual profit is defined as RB(s1, s2). Moreover, as it is explained above, R
B
(
si
1
(s2), s2
)
(i =
N,L) is increasing in s2. Thus, with any liquidity decision (s1, s2) in the region B +B
′, we have
RB(s1, s2) ≤ R
B(si
1
(sˇ2), sˇ2
)
< RA
(
si
1
(s¨2), s¨2
)
(i = N,L).
In addition, when the bank’ residual profit is defined as RA(s1, s2), R
A
(
si
1
(s¨2), s¨2
)
< RA(0, sˆi
2
) (i =
N,L) is satisfied, because (s1, s2) = (0, sˆ
i
2
) (i = L,N) is optimal. Then, we have the following result.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the bank can hold the safe assets and/or the liquid assets as liquidity.
In addition, suppose that there exists NSFR-type regulation or LCR-type one and the bank cannot
choose (s1, s2) = (0, s¨2) under either of the regulations. Then, the bank’s optimal liquidity decision
(s∗
1
, s∗
2
) satisfies following properties, regardless which type of regulations exists.
1. The maximum value of RB(s1, s2) is always smaller than the maximum value of R
A(s1, s2),
and thus, s¨2 ≤ s
∗
2
is satisfied.
2. When β is sufficiently large, the bank’s optimal liquidity decision is (s∗
1
, s∗
2
) =
(
si
1
(s¨2), s¨2
)
,
otherwise, (s∗
1
, s∗
2
) = (0, sˆi
2
) is satisfied, where i = N under NSFR-type regulation and i = L
under LCR-type one.
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In addition, because it is clear that β˜N > β˜L is satisfied, we have the following corollary regarding
how likely the bank is to choose s1 > 0 as the optimal liquidity decision.
Corollary 2. With the same parameters, the bank is more likely to choose
(
si
1
(s¨2), s¨2
)
rather than
(0, sˆi
2
) as the optimal liquidity decision under LCR-type regulation than it is under NSFR-type regu-
lation.
In other words, LCR-type regulation is more likely to lead to the bank’s investment in the liquid
assets than NSFR-type regulation is.
5 Comparing two types of liquidity regulation
5.1 Two types of the liquidity regulation
As it is explained in the previous subsection, the bank’s liquidity decision (s1, s2) under i-type
liquidity regulations is
(
si
1
(s¨2), s¨2
)
or (0, sˆi
2
), and actual decision depends on how large β is and
which type of regulation exists. Then, because RA(s1, s2) is decreasing in both of s1 and s2, which
type of regulation is more optimal depends on which of the lines s1 = s
N
1
(s2) and s1 = s
L
1
(s2) exists
more left in the region s¨2 ≤ s2. Although the exact positions of the two lines depend on many
parameters and it is difficult to obtain clear results, there are some implications.
When the line s1 = s
L
1
(s2) exists on the left part of the line s1 = s
N
1
(s2) in the region s¨2 ≤ s2, at
least sN
1
(s2) > s
L
1
(s2) is satisfied. The inequality is expressed as
(η +∆)Drd + α(1− η −∆)Dr
2
d − αBR2
βR1 − αR2
>
(η +∆)Drd + ρ(1− η −∆)Dr
2
d
βBR1
.
Define γ ≡ βBR1/[βBR1 − αR2](< 1), and then, the inequality can be rewritten as
γ(η +∆)Drd + γα(1− η −∆)Dr
2
d
βBR1
−
αBR2
βR1 − αR2
>
(η +∆)Drd + ρ(1− η −∆)Dr
2
d
βBR1
,
Drd
βBR1
[
−(1− γ)(η +∆)Drd + (γα− ρ)(1− η −∆)rd
]
−
αBR2
βR1 − αR2
> 0.
Thus, in order that sL
1
(s2) < s
N
1
(s2) is satisfied, at least γα− ρ > 0 must be satisfied. Because both
α and γ are smaller than 1, γα − ρ > 0 implies that ρ is sufficiently close to 0. Therefore, when
LCR-type regulation is sufficiently strict, ρ is so large that sL
1
(s2) < s
N
1
(s2) is not satisfied. Then,
the line s1 = s
L
1
(s2) exists on the right part of the line s1 = s
N
1
(s2) in the region s¨2 ≤ s2 as in the
Figure 1.
This implication can be derived in another way. The constraint of LCR-type regulation is ex-
pressed as
s2Brs + βs1BR1 ≥ (η +∆)rdD + ρ(1− η −∆)r
2
dD,
⇔
[
s2Brs + βs1BR1 − (η +∆)rdD
]
≥ ρ(1− η −∆)r2dD.
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The constraint of NSFR-type one is expressed as
BR2 +B
(
βR1
α
−R2
)
s1 +B
(rs
α
−R2
)
s2 −
(η +∆)Drd
α
− (1− η −∆)Dr2d ≥ 0,
⇔ α(1− s1 − s2)BR2 + s2Brs + βs1BR1 ≥ (η +∆)Drd + α(1− η −∆)Dr
2
d,
⇔
[
s2Brs + βs1BR1 − (η +∆)Drd
]
≥ −α
[
(1− s1 − s2)BR2 − (1− η −∆)Dr
2
d
]
.
Thus, LCR-type regulation requires the bank holding more liquidity than the amount of maximum
repayment at t = 1 because it pays more attention to holding liquidity between t = 1 and t = 2.
On the other hand, NSFR-type regulation permits the bank to hold less liquidity than (η +∆)Drd
if it can survive at t = 2. Requiring the bank to hold more liquidity means that it must choose
large s1 and s2, and thus, the constraint of LCR-type regulation is likely to exist the left part of the
constraint of NSFR-type one.
The above result implies that
(
sN
1
(s¨2), s¨2
)
and (0, sˆN
2
) are likely to be more optimal for the bank
than
(
sL
1
(s¨2), s¨2
)
and (0, sˆL
2
). Moreover, it implies that the amount of lending (1 − s∗
1
− s∗
2
)B can
be larger under NSFR-type regulation than it is under LCR-type regulation. Thus, one of the
implication of the model is that NSFR-type regulation is more likely to be optimal than LCR-type
regulation. However, as Diamond and Kashyap (2016) points out, this result depends on the model’s
setting that η +∆ is fixed.
Suppose that there are many banks in the economy and each bank’s depositors have different
values regarding η and ∆. Then, first, consider how to regulate these banks by one NSFR-type
regulation. When a regulator sets the variable η + ∆ at some level to make the banks stable, he
or she must set the level so that even the bank with maximum repayment at t = 1 can survive.
Then, because all of the other banks must obey the constraint that is based on the largest value
of η + ∆, they need to hold more liquidity than the amount that is calculated by using their own
η + ∆. Thus, the total amount of excess liquidity in the economy can be so large. Next, consider
how to regulate these banks by one LCR-type regulation. In this case, the regulator can use not
η + ∆ but ρ as the tool to make them stable, and thus, they can decide the amount of liquidity
based on their own η +∆. As a result, although each bank has some amount of excess liquidity, the
total amount of excess liquidity in the economy can be kept relatively moderate, especially when ρ is
small. Therefore, when we consider heterogeneous banks, LCR-type regulation can be optimal than
NSFR-type regulation.
5.2 Bank’s lending and liquidity regulations
As it is explained above, when the bank can hold the liquid assets as liquidity, it can choose not only
to hold only the safe assets but also to hold both the safe assets and the liquid assets. Then, either
liquidity decision satisfies the regulation’s requirement regardless of the regulation’s type. It implies
that these two liquidity decisions are indifferent with respect of the bank’s stability. However, it
does not always guarantee that these two decision are indifferent with regard to the amounts of the
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bank’s lending.
Suppose that there exists NSFR-type regulation. Then, the bank’s liquidity decision (s1, s2)
is
(
sN
1
(s¨2), s¨2
)
when β˜N ≤ β is satisfied, whereas it is (0, sˆN
2
) when β ≤ β˜N is satisfied. Denote
the amount of its lending when its liquidity decision is (0, sˆN
2
) as M¯NB. It implies that M¯NB ≡
(1−0− sˆN
2
)B is satisfied and we have M¯N ≡ 1− sˆN
2
. Then, suppose that, with some liquidity decision
(s¯1, s¯2), the amount of its lending is larger than or equal to M¯
NB, that is, M¯NB ≤ (1 − s¯1 − s¯2)B
is satisfied. Then, by rewriting this inequality, we have
M¯NB ≤ (1− s¯1 − s¯2)B ⇔ s¯1 ≤ −s¯2 + 1− M¯
N ,
⇔ s¯1 ≤ −s¯2 + sˆ
N
2
.
Figure 3: the region where the amount of bank’s lending increases compared with (0, sˆi
2
)
Thus, if the liquidity decision
(
sN
1
(s¨2), s¨2
)
leads to at least the same amount of its lending as
(0, sˆN
2
) does, the point
(
sN
1
(s¨2), s¨2
)
must not exist on the upper part of the line s1 = −s¯2 + sˆ
N
2
.
Then, because the slope of the line s1 = −s¯2 + sˆ
N
2
is −1 and the slope of the line s1 = s
N
1
(s2) is
−(rs−αR2)/(βR1−αR2) < −1, point
(
sN
1
(s¨2), s¨2
)
exists on the upper part of the line s1 = −s¯2+ sˆ
N
2
,
as it is in Figure 3. In other words, liquidity decision
(
sN
1
(s¨2), s¨2
)
always leads to smaller amount
of the bank’s lending than (0, sˆN
2
) does. When there exists LCR-type regulation, we still obtain a
similar result, that is, the liquidity decision
(
sL
1
(s¨2), s¨2
)
always leads to smaller amount of the bank’s
lending than (0, sˆL
2
) does.
Then, the results are summarized as follows.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the bank’s optimal liquidity decision is
(
si
1
(s¨2), s¨2
)
or (0, sˆi
2
) where
i = N under NSFR-type regulation and i = L under LCR-type one. Then, regardless which type
regulations exists and which of the liquidity decision is optimal for the bank, the amount of the bank’s
lending with
(
si
1
(s¨2), s¨2
)
is always smaller than that with (0, sˆi
2
).
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In other words, holding liquid assets as liquidity involves the bank’s lending decreasing as the
outcome of its profit maximization. In addition, as it is mentioned above, holding both the liquid
assets and the safe assets in more likely to be chosen under LCR-type regulation than it is under
NSFR-type one. Then, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3. With same parameters, the amount of the bank’s lending is more likely to decrease
under LCR-type regulation than it is under NSFR-type regulation.
6 Conclusion
In this study, we analyze how a bank chooses its portfolio under liquidity regulations in the economy
there exist safe assets, liquid assets and lending. The results are summarized as follows.
First, the analysis shows that, regardless type of the liquidity regulation, the bank still holds an
ex-post excess amount of liquidity even when it can use the liquidity assets as sources of liquidity
besides the safe assets (reserves). This result mainly depends on the model’s setting that the bank
needs to prepare the nervous depositors’ withdrawals that are not actually taken place under the
regulations, and thus, introducing another assets cannot solve the problem.
Second, the analysis shows that relying only on the safe assetsis not the only choice of the bank
under liquidity regulations and that holding both the safe assets and the liquid assets can be chosen
when the return of liquidating the liquid asset is sufficient large. In other words, if there exist assets
that are slightly inefficient as sources of liquidity but yield more return than the safe assets, banks
have an incentive to substitute these assets for the safe assets. In addition, in this case, the model
shows that the amount of the safe assets is equal to the amount that is actually needed. In other
words, with respect to the safe assets, banks hold ex-post efficient amount of the assets.
Third, the analysis shows that, although holding both the safe assets and the liquid assets and
holding only the safe assets are indifferent with regard to the liquidity regulations, the former causes
larger reduction of the bank’s lending than the latter does, even when the former is optimal for
its profit. Taking the second result into account, this result implies that it is optimal for banks
to reduce their lending in order to keep the safe assets at the ex-post efficient amount. Thus, if
a regulator wants to make banks stable but does not want to decrease their lending, the liquidity
regulation causes the incompatibility between the regulator’s and the banks’ objects. In addition,
the model shows that the probability that banks choose to hold both the safe assets and the liquid
assets depends partly on the type of liquidity regulation.
These results imply that banks’ decisions for mitigating losses caused by liquidity regulations lead
to an undesired outcome with respect of the amount of their lending, and thus, we consider more
carefully banks’ decisions under liquidity regulations.
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